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STANDING TO CHALLENGE
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
THE LIMITS OF
TRAFFICANTE V. METROPOLITAN LIFE
In Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., ' the United
States Supreme Court utilized its first opportunity to broaden the
class of plaintiffs permitted to challenge housing discrimination under
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.2 Plaintiffs, tenants of the
Parkmerced apartment complex in San Francisco, filed suit against
the owners and proprietors of the Parkmerced, 3 alleging that de-
fendants' racially discriminatory rental policies4 denied tenants the
benefits of living in an integrated community. Consequently, plain-
tiffs alleged loss of business and professional advantages by being
stigmatized as residents of a "white ghetto."5
Pursuant to section 810 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,6 plain-
1. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 et seq. (1970).
3. At the same time the suit was filed, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
-,as the exclusive owner of the building. While the case was pending in the district
court, defendant Metropolitan Life sold a partial interest to the Parkmerced
Corporation and upon motion of plaintiff, Parkmerced was joined as an addi-
tional party. Brief for Respondent Parkmerced Corp. at 6-7, Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants systematically discriminated against mem-
bers of minority racial and ethnic groups in connection with rental practices and
that defendants discouraged minority applicants from applying by misrepresenting
the availability of apartments, manipulating the waiting list and utilizing dis-
criminatory admission standards. 409 U.S. at 208.
5. The Parkmerced is a 3500-unit apartment complex that is approximately
99% white even though it is situated in an area of San Francisco in which the
rental units range from 11 to 56% black. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF
HOUSING: 1970, BLOCK STATISTICS, FINAL REPORT, HC (3)-24 (SAN FRANCISCO-
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA URBANIZED AREA), 1, 219, 221, 226. See Brief for
Petitioner at 5 n.2, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
6. Section 810(a) as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) provides in part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter "person aggrieved")
may file a complaint with the Secretary. Complaints shall be in writing and
shall contain such information and be in such form as the Secretary requires.
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tiffs claimed to be "persons aggrieved" and sued for damages and in-
junctive relief. Based on two determinations, a lower court dismissal7
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 First, the court
of appeals narrowly construed "persons aggrieved," holding plaintiffs
failed to meet the requirements of standing by their failure to allege
that they were the "direct objects of any discriminatory housing
practice." 9 Although the Ninth Circuit conceded that some injury
may have accrued to the plaintiffs from the maintenance of a "white
ghetto," the court decided that plaintiffs in order to have obtained
standing should have alleged "specific acts of discrimination" directed
at the individual plaintiffs.10 The second determination was that the
suit was filed to correct "patterns or practices" of discrimination and
as such may only be maintained by the Attorney General of the
United States.-1 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on
both issues. The Supreme Court granted weight to an administrative
decision by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development defining "persons aggrieved" to include the plaintiffs
Upon receipt of such a complaint the Secretary shall furnish a copy of the
same to the person or persons who allegedly committed or are about to
commit the alleged discriminatory housing practice. Within thirty days after
receiving a complaint, or within thirty days after the expiration of any period
of reference under sub-section (c) of this section, the Secretary shall inves-
tigate the complaint and give notice in writing to the person aggrieved
whether he intends to resolve it. If the Secretary decides to resolve the com-
plaint, he shall proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discrimina-
tory housing practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and
persuasion.
7. The district court dismissed the action on the sole ground that plaintiffs, as
tenants, did not have standing to challenge racially discriminatory practices by
defendant against minority applicants who were not parties to the action. Traffi-
cante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
8. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
9. 446 F.2d at 1162.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1163. The Court was referring to 42 U.S.C. § 3613 which provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance
to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that
any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this sub-
chapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may
bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court by filing
with it a complaint setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive
relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for
such pattern or practice or denial of rights, as he deems necessary to insure
the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter.
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in this case,12 and in a unanimous decision held that vitality could be
given to section 810 (a) "only by a generous construction which gives
standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by
racial discrimination in the management of those facilities under the
auspices of HUD."" The Court also reversed the Ninth Circuit by
upholding the role of plaintiffs as "private attorneys general" able to
enforce the provisions of Title VIII.14
The fundamental question in Traflicante involves the liberalization
of a statutory construction to an extent the judicial and constitutional
restraints of standing will permit. The Court's decision in favor of
plaintiffs is supported by the legislative history and administrative
interpretation of Title VIII, the cases establishing the tests for stand-
ing, and case law involving similar statutory language. Is, however,
the Court's decision to grant standing only to those "in the same hous-
ing unit who are injured by racial discrimination" consistent with the
forces of public policy and case law that influenced the Court to
liberalize the construction of "persons aggrieved," or is the decision
an arbitrary boundary line with only narrow applicability?
An examination of the Traflicante decision must begin with the
determination of whether the liberalization of the definition of "per-
sons aggrieved" so as to include plaintiffs in this case violates basic
judicial and constitutional principles of standing. The facts of Traffi-
cante represent a "case" or "controversy" as required by the Consti-
tution,"5 and an adversary conflict'16 involving neither a political
question 17 nor a hypothetical set of facts."" The early test for standing
was first enunciated in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee
Valley Authority 9 and depended upon whether the parties had a legal
12. The Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD, Clifton R. Jeffers, wrote
the attorneys for the plaintiffs that "It is the determination of this office that the
complainants are aggrieved persons and as such are within the jurisdiction of Title
VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act." See Brief for Petitioner at 21, Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
Statutory constructions by administrative agencies have been given "great
weight" by the Court. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
13. 409 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 211.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
19. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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interest in the outcome of the proceedings. 20 In 1970, a more liberal
two-part test was substituted by Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp.21 The new standard requires first, that there
exist "injury in fact"' 22 to the plaintiff, and second, that the alleged
injury is to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated." 2
Plaintiffs in Traficante meet the "injury in fact" test since they
alleged individual injury to themselves as required by Sierra Club v.
Morton,24 even though the injury was not economic.25 The Court has
often discussed the injury to individuals and society that arises from
racial discrimination and has held that deprivation of interracial
associations is a legally cognizable injury.26 In further support of
plaintiffs' allegation of "injury in fact," affidavits were submitted
discussing the adverse effects on plaintiffs of living in a segregated
community.27
20. Id. at 137-38.
21. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
22. Id. at 152.
23. Id. at 153. The case involved standing to review an administrative action.
In Trafficante, both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court accepted without
question that these same legal standards should apply to civil rights litigation.
The Data Processing test for standing has been much criticized as inviting a
decrease in judicial involvement and a rise in discretionary justice. Dugan, Stand-
ing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. REs. L. Rzv. 256,
258 (1971). Some commentators have suggested that "injury in fact" should be
the sole criterion; see, e.g., Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cux.
L. REv. 601, 613-14, 618 (1968). Justices Brennan and White agreed. In Barlow
v. Collins, they said that "injury in fact" guarantees the litigant can "frame
the relevant questions with specificity, contest the issues with the necessary ad-
verseness, and pursue the litigation vigorously." 397 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1970)
(dissenting opinion).
24. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
25. In earlier cases, the Court only recognized economic injury as a basis for
standing. More recent cases, however, have been litigated on other than economic
injury. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Citizens Comn'n for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97,
103 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Office of Communication
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 714 (W.D.N.Y. 1970),
afl'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
27. Dr. Alan F. Poussaint, Associate Dean of the Harvard Medical School and
a consultant psychiatrist to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, submitted an
affidavit dealing with the adverse psychological effect of living in a segregated
community. One petitioner is black and represents one of the "token" one-half
% black residents of the Parkmerced community. According to Doctor Poussaint,
severe injury can accrue to "token" blacks. See Brief for Petitioner at Appendix
E, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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To determine whether plaintiffs' rights were "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected" by the law,28 the Court searched the
legislative history of Title VIII. During the legislative discussions of
the bill, various congressmen alluded to specific discriminatory ac-
tions for which the person denied housing would have recourse under
Title VIII.29 These references are grounds for supporting an implied
congressional intent to provide a remedy only for those persons who
are the direct objects of the discrimination.30 Some congressmen,
however, argued in favor of passage of Title VIII because of the ad-
verse consequences arising from segregated housing to the entire
society.31 Remarks alluding to this aspect of Title VIII suggest a
broad intent to allow access to the courts to a larger section of the
community who are injured by segregated housing. Other than in-
advertent comments by congressmen discussing Title VIII, the legis-
lative hearings never directly touched the issue of standing. The
Court, having noted that the legislative history was not too helpful,
held that Title VIII was intended to protect the entire community
since many more persons than those who are direct objects of dis-
crimination suffer from segregated housing.32
Apart from the fundamental judicial principles of standing that
have evolved in other areas, the Court may have been impressed by
the long line of civil rights cases that have consistently expanded the
class of plaintiffs able to initiate civil rights litigation in view of the
28. For the final form of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act as passed by the
Senate see 114 CoNG. REc. 5992 (1968), and as passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives see 114 CONG. REc. 9620 (1968). The final act had many predecessors
and the hearings surrounding these original proposals are helpful in determining
legislative intent. See H.R. 2511, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); S. 1358, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 et seq. (1966);
Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
29. See comments by Senator Javits in114 CONG. Rnc. 2706 (1968);Senator
Hart in 114 CONG. REc. 3247 (1968); and Senator Mondale in 114 CONG. REC.
2013 (1968).
30. Brief for Respondent Parkmerced Corp. at 18-21, Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. See comments by Senator Mondale in Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, S.
2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1967); and comments by
Representative Celler in 114 CONG. REC. 9556 (1968).
32. 409 U.S. at 210.
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strong policy to eliminate racial discrimination.3 In the area of public
education, standing has been conferred upon parents of white as well
as black children to correct patterns of racial segregation in the
schools,34 and upon students to challenge racially discriminatory
faculty assignments.35 In the area of public accommodations, black
plaintiffs have been held to be "aggrieved parties" to challenge segre-
gated public transport even though defendant's segregation policies
were never enforced,3 and white plaintiffs have been held to have
standing to demand use of restaurants in the company of black
patrons.37 In employment cases, the courts have also recognized the
injury suffered by white as well as black employees from racially dis-
criminatory activities by the employerAs Cases concerning discrimi-
natory housing have broadened concepts of standing to include pro-
spective home buyers challenging a discriminatory zoning ordinance,""
neighbors suing to enjoin construction of a low-income housing proj-
ect in the immediate vicinity,40 and white landowners challenging
the city's failure to rezone on the grounds that it perpetuated racial
segregation.41
33. The attitude of encouraging civil rights litigation as a strong public policy
has been expressed often by the Court. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of
Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
34. Hobson v. Hansen, 320 F. Supp. 409 (D.D.C. 1970); Lee v. Nyquist, 318
F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
35. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
36. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
37. Tolg v. Grimes, 355 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d
110 (5th Cir. 1963).
38. Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 951 (1970); NLR.B v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1965).
39. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawana, 318 F. Supp. 669, aff'd,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970).
40. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs in this case
would not have been displaced, nor would they have become future occupants of
the proposed project. Nevertheless, the court held the placement of the project
in the neighborhood would affect "the very quality of their daily lives," and there-
fore plaintiffs had standing. Id. at 817-18.
41. Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill.
1971). Plaintiffs proposed to sell property that the city refused to rezone in order
to allegedly keep the area segregated. Even though the white plaintiffs were not
racially excluded, they had standing to test the arbitrariness of the city's action.
Id. at 400-02.
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Although the line of cases liberalizing standing in civil rights cases
may be persuasive, defendant argued that a suit by a private party
was usurping the right of the Attorney General to sue to correct a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination. 2 The Ninth Circuit relied on
specific language of section 3613 of the United States Code43 which
grants the Attorney General the right to sue, and held that this section
did not create a private right of action. 4 A consistent line of cases,
however, support the utilization of private attorneys general as a
mechanism for enforcement of civil rights cases. In Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc.,45 the Supreme Court upheld the use of the
private attorney general to vindicate the strong national policy of
desegregated public accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.48 In Allen v. State Board of Electionsy7 the court permitted
private action to enforce the 1965 Voting Rights Act4- and said that
enforcement would be severely hampered if it were totally dependent
on the Attorney General. 49 In the area of equal opportunity employ-
ment, the Fifth Circuit upheld the right to maintain a private action
even though the Attorney General had the authority to sue to correct
"patterns or practices" of discrimination."0
In addition to the line of cases supporting the use of private at-
torneys general, the United States as amicus curiae pointed out that
the small staff of the Attorney General's Housing Section of the Civil
Rights Division is not able to adequately enforce Title VIII without
the assistance of private suits. 51 The Court recognized the potential
enforcement limitations and held that such a finding would be con-
trary to the public policy of eliminating racial discrimination.52
In light of the recent trend of cases expanding the concept of stand-
ing in civil rights cases, the policy considerations allowing "private
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 gives the Attorney General the power to sue to correct
a pattern or practice of discrimination. See 409 U.S. at 209, 211.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
44. 446 F.2d at 1162.
45. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970).
47. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
49. 393 U.S. at 556-57.
50. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1970).
51. Brief for United States as amicus curiae at 33-34, Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
52. 409 U.S. at 211.
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attorneys general" to enforce civil rights and the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc.,5 3 finding a "congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III
of the Constitution,""4 the Court's decision to confer standing on the
plaintiffs was a predictable liberalization of "persons aggrieved." The
Court said that it was the entire community that suffered from dis-
criminatory housing practices and not just the person denied hous-
ing.55 The Court chose, however, to limit the definition of "commu-
nity" to include only "residents of the same housing unit."GO The
basis for this limitation is unclear and finds little support in the
Court's own decisions establishing the guidelines for standing. Argu-
ably, a neighbor living across the street from a large segregated hous-
ing unit suffers as much "injury in fact" by being a part of the com-
munity as does a resident of the housing unit itself. Under Traflicante,
the neighbor across the street would not necessarily have standing
even though the resident of the housing unit would. Since the "hous-
ing unit" limitation imposed on the definition of "persons aggrieved"
by Trafficante is not consistent with the Court's criteria for standing,
this incongruity suggests that the limitation will be only an ephemeral
boundary line in the rapidly expanding class of plaintiffs able to
challenge housing discrimination.
Mark Stephen Davis
53. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 446.
55. 409 U.S. at 211.
56. Id. at 212.
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